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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOYLE L. ALLRED, Adlninistrator 
of the Estate of James F. Allred, de-
t•t·a~Pd, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
\"OX.AL ALLRED and AGXI~S ALL- \ Civil Xo. 9980 
RI~~D, husband and wife, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
and 
ISABELL ALLRED, 
Plaintiff in Intervention and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~[EXT OF THE CA.SE 
This case involYes an action by the Administrator 
of the Estate of J mnes F. Allred, deceased, and certain 
heirs, to cancel and rescind the deliYery by an escrow 
agent to t1~e Defendants of certain conveyances of prop-
t.•rt~· and to deterinine the balance owing by said Defend-
ants on the purchase price of said property. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon the trial of the case, at which all the material 
facts were· stipulated to, the District Court, sitting with-
out a jury, detennined that during his lifethne James F. 
Allred and his wife, Isabell Allred (Plaintiff in Inter-
vention) created a joint tenancy between themselves 
in the property in question subject to the contract of 
sale therefore entered into by them with Defendants, 
so that upon the death of James F. Allred, his surviving 
widow, Isabell, becan1e the sole owner of the property 
and entitled to authorize the release of the instruments 
of conveyance by the escrow agent notwithstanding the 
fact that the Defendants had not paid the full purchase 
price required by the contract of sale; that upon the de-
livery of the instruments of conveyance by the escrow 
holder pursuant to authorization from Isabell Allred the 
Defendants obtained title to the property without being 
required to pay the balance owing on the contract of sale. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal is taken by Doyle L. Allred, Administra-
tor of the Estate of James F. Allred, deceased, one of the 
Plaintiffs. Appellant seeks to have this Court determine 
that upon the death of James L. Allred, Isabell Allred 
did not become vested with all interest in and to the prop-
erty, subject to the contract of sale to Defendants, and 
that she could not authorize and direct the escrow agent 
to deliver the instruments of conveyance unless and until 
the full purchase price for the property had been paid 
by Defendants in accordance with the terms of the 
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original rontract; that the contract being in default at 
the tintt· of the death of J amPs Allred, his estate is en-
titled to t--xercise any default provisions therein provided 
fot'. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are that James F. Allred and 
Isabell Allred were husband and wife and resided at 
Cleveland, Utah. ~Ir. Allred operated a farm and live-
stock setup. On ~lay 27, 1958, they entered into a sales 
agreement with \Tonal Allred and Agnes Allred, their son 
tmd daughter-in-law, selling to them land, water stock, 
grazing permits, livestock and farm machinery for the 
~lUll of $17,000.00 to be paid in annual installments of 
$1,000.00 on the first day of December of each year be-
ginning December 1, 1959. No interest was to be charged 
on the unpaid balances. This docmnent is set forth in 
full in the request for admissions of the plaintiff in inter-
vention. (Since the record is not numbered, it is im-
possible to refer to the specific pages therein. See, how-
t~\·Pr, Tr. pp. 6, 7 for reference to the contract.) This 
agreement provides that the deed and water stock and the 
bill of sale on the personal property should be placed 
m escrow. 
Four days later on ~fay 31, 1958, James F. Allred 
and Isabell Allred signed a letter of escrow instructions 
to A. John Ruggeri and placed these instruments of con-
veyance and the contract of sale with hun as part of the 
l'~erow. (See Record, Tr. p. 7) 
The purchasers 1nade the $1000.00 payment due De-
cember 1. 1959, but did not make the payment due Decem-
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ber 1, 1960, J mnes F. Allred, one of the vendors died on 
February 24, 1961 (Tr. p. 7). 
At the time J mnes F. Allred died there was due on 
said contract $16,000.00 with one payment of $1000.00 
delinquent. 
On April 5, 1961, the surviving wife of James ]1 • 
Allred, Isabell Allred, signed a document entitled Re-
lease of Escrow Paper directed to A. John Ruggeri, ('H-
crow agent, directing hi1n to deliver to the purchasers 
V onal Allred and Agnes A.llred the \V arranty Deed, the 
stock certificate on the water stock, the Bill of ~ale on the 
livestock and fann machinery and the transfer of the 
grazing permits. She certified in this letter that the full 
purchase price of $17,000.00 had been paid and that all 
conditions precedent to the delivery of the escrow papers 
had been performed. Actually there was still $16,000.00 
due on this contract. (Tr. p. 7) 
The letter of instructions to the escrow agent dated 
.May 31, 1958, and also the release of escrow papers dated 
April 5, 1961, are set forth in full in the request for ad-
missions of plaintiff-in-intervention and are contained 
in the Record on Appeal. 
Thereafter, son1e of the children of J an1es F. Allred, 
deceased, filed this action in the District Court of Emery 
County against V onal Allred and Agnes Allred, husband 
and wife, requesting the District Court to set aside the 
delivery of conveyances of real and personal property 
to the Defendants, and also asking the Distrjct Court to 
detennine the balance due on the sales agreen1ent and for 
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n •·econveyanre back to the estate of James F. Allred, 
dt•{'(•asPd, and to his surviving wife, Isabell Allred. Im-
nwdiat~ly after the Cmnplaint was filed a petition was 
fi!t·d to appoint Doyle L. Allred as Administrator of 
tlw 1-:statP of J a1nes F. Allred, deceased. This was done 
and thP Adininistrator of the James F. Allred Estate was 
made an additional party plaintiff. 
After the defendants, Vonal Allred and Agnes All-
red, filed their answer, Isabell Allred petitioned the Court 
for lean• to intervene. Leave was given her to intervene 
and ::;h1• filed her Complaint in Intervention, wherein 
sht• set forth that she was the surviving joint tenant 
under the contract of sale and entitled to receive all of 
the proceeds upon the death of her husband James F. 
Allred, and that she directed the escrow agent to release 
tlw papers held by him to V onal and Agnes Allred. 
In her answer to interrogatories, Isabell Allred, 
plaintiff-in-intervention, stated that she and her deceased 
hnshand had received or had had applied for their benefit 
tlw total su1n of $3,059.02 and that the balance of the 
purchase price had been acquitted. (See Record) 
~-\t the trial of the case the Defendants Vonal Allred 
and ~\gnPs Allred, tendered receipts totaling $3,145.10, 
which were received in evidence by the Court. (Tr. p. 29) 
This amount included the $1000.00 paid December 1, 1959, 
and the balance was represented by the payment of last 
i lhwss and burial expenses of James F. Allred, deceased, 
and the payn1ent of $611.83 to the Carbon Emery Bank 
which tlH:'Y claitned was an encumbrance against the water 
stork. 
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Plaintiff in intervention filed a n1otion for summary 
judgment which was heard and denied by the Court. 
There was a pretrial on February 18, 1963, and a Pretrial 
Order prepared and signed by the Court setting forth the 
issues. (See Record.) The trial was held on April 29, 
1963. Frmn an adverse decision at the trial plaintiffs 
filed a 1notion for a new trial and to a1nend the findings 
and decree. (See Record.) The Court denied the motion 
for a new trial and the motion to an1end the decree. ( Tr. 
p. 90) The Court did grant the motion to amend the 
findings to show that there had only been one payment of 
$1000.00 made on Dece1nber 1, 1959, and that a payment 
of $1,000.00 was delinquent when James F. Allred died 
and there was a balance due on the contract of $16,000.00 
at the time of his death. (Tr. p. 86, 87) Mr. Hobbs was 
directed by the Court to 1nake the amendment to the ori-
ginal findings (Tr. p. 87); but the record now on appeal 
fails to show that such a1nendment was made. 
The evidence submitted to the Court and on which 
the Court 1nade its determination was documentary and 
appears in the Record attached to the Requests for Ad-
Inissions or as Answers to Interrogatories. (Tr. p. 20) 
It was agreed by counsel at pretrial that the property 
sold to V onal and Agnes Allred was owned by James F. 
Allred and Isabell Allred in three different types of 
ownership. All of the water stock, livestock, and personal 
property was owned by Jan1es F. Allred, individually. 
Part of the land was owned by J runes F. Allred, individu-
ally, and part by Isabell Allred, individually, and part 
of the land was owned by the two of the1n as joint ten-
ants. (Tr. p. 46) These instruments of ownership appear 
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n:-; Exhibits to the answPrs by Defendants to Plaintiffs' 
Interrogatories; and the trial court made a finding to 
this effect. (Tr. p. 62) 
The trial court determined in its Conclusions of Law 
that "the execution of the contract of sale by 
.James F. Allred and Isabell Allred on May 27, 
1958, constituted an equitable conversion of their 
interests in the real and personal property sub-
ject of the said contract of sale to an interest in 
personalty, being the proceeds due them under 
the said contract of sale." 
The court further concluded that "by the execution 
of the letter of instructions to A. John Ruggeri as 
escrow agent, and by execution and delivery of 
instruments of conveyance of the property subject 
of the contract of sale to the escrow agent, the 
said James F. Allred and Isabell Allred created 
between themselves a joint tenancy in their prop-
erty interests as sellers under the contract of sale." 
In consequence of the foregoing the court determined 
that upon the death of James F. Allred the surviving 
widow became the sole owner of the right to receive the 
proceeds from the contract of sale and could waive the 
performance by the purchasers of the conditions of the 
contract; that no interest in either the real property or 
the proceeds to be derived from the sale thereof passed 
to the estate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE 
OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION. 
The court below upheld what was in effect a gift 
from Isabell Allred to the Defendants of substantially 
all of the property owned by the deceased, James F. All-
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red, prior to the execution of the agreement of sale, 
even though such a gift was obviously contrary to the 
intention of decedent as expressed in the letter of escrow 
instruction, and even though, the net result thereof would 
be substantially to disinherit the other children. In ar-
riving at its decision, the court invoked the doctrine of 
equitable conversion. Appellant contends that the results 
of the decision are repugnant to fundamental concepts 
of equity, and that the court below erred in applying 
the doctrine of equitable conversion to accmnplish such 
inequitable results. 
The authorities are in agreement that the doctrine 
of equitable conversion does not apply when inequitable 
results follow from its application. In an early case ap-
plying the doctrine, the U. S. Supreme Court said: 
"The doctrine of equitable conversion is based 
on the principle that equity regards things dir-
ected or agreed to be done as having been actually 
performed where nothing has intervened which 
ought to prevent a perfonnance. . .. If something 
has intervened which ought to prevent it, the doc-
trine of equitable conversion will not be applied. 
It does not exist as a matter of right and is not 
applicable to all circumstances. It is a fiction in-
vented by co1trts to be applied only zchen neces-
sary and j11stice requires its exercise." (Emphasis 
added.) (Craig v. Leslie, 3 \Vheat 563, 16 U.S. 
563, 4 L. Ed. 560) 
In Schneider v. Schneider, 135 Kan. 734, 12 P2d 834, 
836, the court stated: 
"As pointed out in the Yerkes case, it is not 
a rule of right; hence it is not one which can be 
invoked under all circu1nstances. It is designed to 
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promote equity, heneP it should not be used as a 
basis to accmnplish inequitable results." 
The tenden<·~· of courts to overlook the fact that 
t>ttuitable <'<>nversion does not apply as a fixed rule of 
law iH rPeognized hy the court in r erkes v. Yerkes, 200 
I ,u. 419, 50 A. 186, where the court stated: 
"Its application requires constant watchful-
tw~~ to guard against the tendency to become a 
formal rule de jure without regard to its real 
purpose and necessity. It should never be over-
looked that there is no real conversion. The prop-
Prty remains all the time in fact realty or person-
alty. As it was, but for the purpose of the will, 
so far as it may be necessary, and only so far, it is 
treated in contemplation of law as if it had been 
converted." 
It ~PPlllS clear that one of the fundamental purposes 
of the doctrine of equitable conversion is to carry out the 
intent of the parties to a contract. In Inghram v. Chand-
ler, 179 Iowa 304, 161 N."\V. 434, L.R.A. 1917D, 713, the 
ronrt ~tatPs: 
"The real purpose of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion is to give effect to the manifest intent 
of a testator or vendor and to treat that as done 
which, by will, the testator has directed to be done 
or that which, by previous contract with another, 
both have mutually bound themselves to do. Its 
application is always withheld if it should appear 
to foil the intent of the testator or to u·ork in-
Justice in tl1e particular case.'' 
In 19 Am. J u r. "Equitable Conversion" Section 4. 
the following observation is made: 
"The purpose of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion is to give effect to the intention of the 
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testator, settlor, or contracting parties, and will 
not be given an effect contrary to such intention." 
Appellant submits that, in its use of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion, the lower court did not carry out 
decedent's intent but frustrated it. In his escrow letter 
of instruction, James Allred provided the 1uethod by 
which the defendants could acquire the property in ques-
tion, at the same time reserving the right to cancel the 
contract for any default in the payment of the purchase 
price. The net effect of the decision of the lower court 
was to uphold a gift of such property to the Defendant 
by ~Irs. Allred. The court reasoned that she was the sole 
owner of the property by right of survivorship and could 
dispose of it as she saw fit. However, Appellant directs 
this Court's attention to the fact that the conversion ef-
fected by the application of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion was an indispensible step in the lower court's 
conclusion that a joint tenancy existed between James 
and Isabell Allred. 
First, it was necessary to satisfy the requirement 
that for the creation of a joint tenancy, there must be 
unity of interest, title, tilne and possession. Since there 
had been separate and jointly held property mixed to-
gether, which did not satisfy the four-unities requirement, 
it was necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable con-
version to establish a cmnmon interest in a fund. 
Second, the conversion of the property from realty 
to personalty was necessary to circu1nvent the statutory 
poHcy expressed in Section 57-1-5, UCA 1953, which limits 
joint tenancies in real property to those clearly Pxpressed 
to be such. 
10 
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Appellant contends that but for the application of 
tlw doctrine of equitable conversion the court would not 
havP btoen able to find that a joint tenancy had been cre-
ntPd. Thus, the determination by the court below that 
~lr~. Allred had the sole ownership as the surviving 
joint tenant of all the property under the contract, and 
that shP could do with such property as she saw fit, was 
made possible only by the application of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion. Appellant contends that the doc-
trine cannot be employed to accomplish such results and 
that the decision of the Court below must be reversed, 
because it reiies on an equitable concept that is inappli-
rable where the results following from its use are in-
equitable. 
Appellant further contends that the court below erred 
in holding that the doctrine of equitable conversion ap-
plied in this matter, because at the time of the death of 
J runes Allred the conditions necessary for the applica-
tion of the doctrine did not exist. (The court found that, 
at the time of James' death, the Defendants were in de-
fault on the agreement.) 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is based on the 
maxim of equity-that equity will regard as done that 
which ought to be done. McClintock on Eqttity, Horn-
book Series ( 2d Ed) Section 106 states : 
"Equitable conversion is the doctrine that 
equity will, in certain cases, treat interests in land 
as though the land had already been converted 
into personal property. It is based on the maxim 
that equity regards that as done which ought to 
be done, and applies wherever there is created by 
11 
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will, contract, or court order an obligation to sell 
land. While that obligation continues in force, 
equity generally will adjudicate the rights of the 
parties as they would have been if the conveyance 
had actually been made." 
In con1menting on the meaning of the equity maxim 
underlying the doctrine of equitable conversion, Pomeroy 
states: 
"In the first place, it should be observed that 
the principle involves the notion of an equitable 
obli.qation existing from smne cause; of a present 
relation of equitable right held by one party, from 
whatever cause arising, that the other should do 
some act, and the corresponding duty, the ou_qht 
resting upon the latter to do such act. Equity does 
not regard and treat as done what might be done, 
or what could be done, but only what ought to be 
done. Nor does the principle operate in favor of 
every person, no matter what may be his situation 
and relations, but only in favor of him who holds 
the equitable right to have the act performed, as 
against the one upon whom the duty of such per-
formance has devolved.'' (Emphasis added.) 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) Ser.-
tion 365, p. 678. 
The doctrine does not apply in the absence of an 
obligation which satisfies the "ought" requirement of the 
definition. Thus, where the thing agreed to be done, 
ought not to be done, the doctrine does not apply. 19 
.:lm. Jttr. "Equitable Conversion," Sec. 2, states: 
"Equitable conversion ... i:s a mere fiction 
resting upon the principle that equity regards 
things which are directed to be done as having ac-
tually been performed where nothing has inter-
12 
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rt·ned whil'h ou,qhf to prcrt'llf such a performauce. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In furtht>r support of the requirement that the 
··ought" dement n1ust be satisfied before the doctrine 
applicH, it Inust be noted that Inany authorities and cases 
have indicated that siinilar principles govern the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitable conversion as govern 
that of the equitable remedy of specific performance. In 
Clay l'. Landreth, 45 S.E. 2d 875, 175 ALR 104, the court 
states: 
"Principles similar to those which govern the 
enforcement of specific enforcement underlie the 
application of equitable conversion. In both cases 
the equitable doctrines and their limitations are 
well defined and stem from the same equitable 
source. Neither will specific performance of a 
contract be decreed nor equitable conversion ap-
plied if, by doing so, hardship and injustice are 
forced upon the parties through a change in cir-
cmnstances not contemplated by them when the 
contract was made." 
19 A 111. .J u r. "Equitable Conversion" Section 11 
states: 
" ... The qttestion in such cases is whether 
at the time of his death, the vendor or pttrchaser, 
a.s the case may be, 1ca.s either absolutely or con-
tingently under such an agreement as equity would 
enforce against him. A conversion is permitted, 
however, if, due to default of title, insufficiency 
of contract, or other cause, the court shmtld feel 
that the contract ought not to be executed. The 
estate, in such an instance, will go to the heir at 
the laze of the vendor, jttst as tho'ltgh no contract 
had e1·er e.risted. (Emphasis added) 
13 
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See also Horton v. Horton, 2 N.J.S. 155, 62 A.2d 503, 
504, where the court observed: 
"The test of the application of the doctrine 
of equitable conversion is whether the contract is 
capable of enforcement by specific performance." 
Since the Defendants were in default on the contract 
m the amount of $1000.00 at the time of the death of 
James Allred, the latter had a right to forfeit the interest 
for such a default. Upon the death of :Mr. Allred, his 
estate had a matured right to cancel the contract and 
regain possession of the property. Thus it can hardly 
be said that as of the time of his death James Allred 
was under any obligation to convey to the Defendant 
and the ''ought'' requirement is not satisfied. During 
such a breach, specific performance would likewise be 
unavailable. 
The rule seems clear that the time that is material 
in determining whether the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion applies is the time of the death of one party to the 
contract. See 19 A1n. Jur. ''Equitable Conversion" Sec-
tion 11: 
"The question in such cases is whether at the 
time of his death, the vendor or purchaser as the 
case 1nay be, was either absolutely or contingently 
under such an agreement as equity would enforce 
against him." 
In further support of the proposition that the time 
of the execution of the contract is not the n1aterial time 
in determining whether equitable conversion applies, 
:McClintock states : 
"The rights of the parties as affected by the 
happening of any event subsequent to the making 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the contract are to be deter1nined by the bind-
ing effect of the contract at the time the event 
oe<'nrred. Where the contract was specifically 
enforceable at the time of the death of one of the 
parties, the fact that it has since become unen-
forceable does not affect the rights of the parties 
or their successors, as they existed at the time of 
the death." (Emphasis added.) (McClintock on 
Equity (1948), Section 106, p. 287) 
Thus, though equitable conversion, if found to apply 
according to the general rule, will be dated from the 
execution of the agreement, the court will look to the time 
of tlw death of the party to deter1nine whether or not 
it actually applies. 
See, also, Liberty National Bank of Washington v. 
Smoot, (Dist. D.C.) 135 F. Supp. 654, in support of this 
proposition. 
Appellant contends that the court below erred in 
finding that the doctrine of equitable conversion ap-
pli~d, in the absence of a specifically enforceable agree-
ment, as of the time of James Allred's death. 
The agreement of sale executed May 27, 1958, at 
page 4 contained a clause, set off in capital letters, which 
~tated that "TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE TO THIS 
AGREE~IENT." Where such a clause exists, there is 
also authority for the position that the doctrine of equit-
able conversion does not apply. In the case of Douglas 
r. U.P.R.R., 5 l{an. 615 (Precedes Pacific Reporter) the 
court states: 
"In equity there is a maxim that equity will 
consider as done that which ought to be done, 
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and that it will look upon all things agreed to be 
done as actually performed .... But this ma.rim 
never applies where time is of the essence of the 
contract, and where the land is subject to abso-
lute forfeiture on failure of some co11dition of 
the sale being perform,ed; for there is no necrssity 
in such a case for courts of equity to resort to any 
s u.ch fiction.'' (Emphasis added) 
See also Standard Lumber Co. v. illiller & Vidor 
Lumber Co., 21 Okla. 617, 96 P. 761. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that where an agreement 
contains a clause making time of the essence and a party 
has failed to perforn1 in accordance with such clause, spe-
cific perfonnance will not be available to him. 49 Am. 
J ur. summarizes the rule as follows: 
"Time may be made of the essence of the con-
tract by express stipulation, or even without an 
express stipulation to that effect where such in-
tention is clearly Inanifested from the agreement 
as a whole. In either case, the court may refuse to 
decree specific performance where it appears that 
the plaintiff failed to perform on his part within 
the stipulated time, unless there is something in 
the facts to take the case out of the usual rule." 
( 49 Am. Jur. "Specific Performance," Section 42) 
Appellant further subn1its that the court below erred 
in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion when 
by such application the statutory policy of Section 
57-1-5 UCA 1953, disfayoring joint, tenancy would there-
by be circu1nvented. There is good authority in support 
of the rule that the doctrine of equitable conversion will 
not apply ·where it interferes with the policy of the state 
16 
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as :;d forth in its ~tatutes. In Pond v. Porter, 1-!1 Conn. 
1.-~~ i, 10-! A. ~d ~~S, ~:33, the court denied the application 
of the doctrine of equitable conversion when it would 
interft~re with the Connecticut statute regarding perpetu-
itil':-i. The court stated: 
", .. the doctrine of equitable conversion is 
not a fixed rule of law, but proceeds upon equit-
able principles which take into account the result 
which its application will accomplish ... If, there-
fore, we assume that under New York law the 
bequest over to the issue of Clara Pond Porter 
would be valid, the application of the doctrine 
of equitable conversion would result in the nullify-
ing of the public policy of this state. Certainly 
the doctrine ought not to be applied to accomplish 
that result. It would be inequitable. In passing 
upon the validity of the testatrix' attempted dis-
position of the remainder interest in the Connec-
ticut property, we must continue to treat the 
property as real estate and therefore subject to 
the law of the state." 
In Xatioua.l Bank of Topeka v. Saia, 154 l(an. 739, 
1:21 P.:2d 251, :25-!, the court refused to apply the doctrine 
of ~quitable conversion where the effect would have been 
to cut off the equity of redemption of another party. 
:Since this 1natter appears to be one of first impres-
sion in l~tah, the Court's attention is directed to the 
~trong minority position which denies the doctrine of 
equitable conversion per se to installment land contracts. 
In following this doctrine the court in Brown v. Thomas, 
37 Kan. :2:3:2, :286, 15 P. 211, 213 stated: 
"The 1naxin1 that equity considers, when land 
is sold on credit, and the deed is to be made when 
the purchase money is paid, that the land at the 
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time of the purchase becmnes the vendee's, and the 
purchase 1noney the vendor's, and that the vendor 
becomes the trustee of the vendee with respect 
to the land, and the vendee the trustee of the 
vendor with respect to the purchase n1oney is not 
applicable here .... The legal title has not passed 
to him (the vendee) because no deed or other con-
veyance has yet been made; and the equitable 
title has not passed, because the land has not been 
paid for, and because-on account of the proYi-
sions for forfeiture-it is clearly the intention of 
the parties, as indicated in the contract, that such 
title shall not pass until the land is paid for." 
See also: ~~lcClintock on Equity, Section 106, p. 287, 
w·hich states : 
"In some jurisdictions, it is held that the 
relationship does not exist so long as the contract 
can be terminated for non-payment of future in-
stallments of the purchase price and that the 
conversion does not occur until the last installment 
is paid." 
See also: Pickens 1'. Campbell (1919) 104 Kan. 425, 
179 P. 343; Lansford v. Gloyd (1923) 89 Okla. 232, 215 
P. 198: Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manheim (1913) 75 Wash. 
641, 135 p. 658. 
Appellant further submits that the lower court erred 
in invoking the doctrine as a means of determining the 
intervivos rights and interests of James and Isabell 
who were co-grantors on the contract of sale. The doc-
trine applies only in those situations where, by contract, 
rights and duties are created between the parties. It 
would seen1 to be improper to make use of the doctrine 
to detennine the intervivos rights of certain parties, as 
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hu:-;lmnd and wife in thi~ ca:-;P. The doctrine applies only 
lu•twePn the vendors and the vendeP in such a contract, 
and not bPtwel·n co-vPndors. In support of this statement 
~we Pomeroy, Equity Jurispnulcw·c, (4th Ed.) Section 
3(i;}: 
'"Equity does not regard and treat as done 
what 1night be done, or what could be done, but 
only what ought to be done. l\T or does the principle 
operate in favor of every person, no matter 1chat 
may be his situation and relations, but only in 
faror of him who holds the equitable right to have 
the act performed, as against the one upon u'lwm 
thl' duty of such performance has devol·ted." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In conclusion, Appellant refers the Court to the 
Findings of Fact which give no basis for involving the 
doctrine of equitable conversion. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS CREATED A JOINT 
TENANCY WITH FULL RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP . 
• \s a rP:~mlt of a legislative policy disfavoring the 
crPation of joint tenancies, where an estate is transferred 
to two or n1ore 1)eople, there is a presun1ption that a com-
mon tenancy is created. -tS CJ S 918 summarizes the law 
as follows: 
'"Under the modern practice and statutory 
rules ... the common-law presun1ption that it was 
the intention of the parties to the transfer of an 
estate to two or more persons to create a joint 
tenancy is replaced by the contrary presumption; 
that the parties intended to create a tenancy in 
conunon rather than a joint tenancy. According-
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ly, where the instrument is silent or ambiguous 
as to the nature of the joint estate created, it 
will be construed as creating a tenancy in common 
and not a joint tenancy. A construction of an in-
strument as creating a joint tenancy is to be avoid-
ed, but the presumption against a joint tenancy 
is rebuttable." 
In Utah, the legislature has in several instances by 
statute established a presumption of common tenancy. 
Section 57-1-5 UCA 1953 creates a presumption of com-
mon tenancy in transfers or conveyances of real estate to 
two or more people unless a joint tenancy is otherwise 
expressly declared. Section 60-1-6 UCA 1953 creates a 
tenancy in common when undivided shares of goods are 
conveyed to two or more persons. Section 7-3-45 UCA 
1953, dealing with joint bank accounts, establishes special 
language for the creation of a joint tenancy in a bank 
account. In addition to the above statutes, and the mod-
ern common law rule establishing a presumption of ten-
ancy in common, there is the equitable rule previously 
cited favoring the creation of tenancies in common. 
Based on the above statutes, the common law (adopt-
ed as the law in this state) and the equitable rule here-
tofore referred to, it is the law in Utah that a tenancy in 
comrnon is created by a transfer to two or rnore persons, 
unless there is express language creating a joint tenancy. 
Since the court below determined that a joint tenancy 
was created, we must look to the findings to determine 
the basis therefor. In its Finding No. 4, the court finds 
that the instruments of conveyance 
" . should be delivered to the purchaser~ 
therein, the defendants Yonal Allred and Agnes 
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Allred, if and when the purchase price shall have 
been paid in full to the said J runes F. Allred, de-
<·eased, and the plaintiff in intervention, Isabell 
Allred, or to the survivor of them." 
lf this Court determines that the doctrine of equitable 
l'OilVPrsion was erroneously invoked below, and that Sec-
tion i)'i -1-3 UCA 1953 applies to the creation of a joint 
tenancy, then Appellant submits that the conditions of 
the statute are not satisfied. The statute provides two 
methods for the creation of a joint tenancy in real estate: 
"A sole owner of real property shall create 
a joint tenancy in himself and another or others 
by making a transfer to himself and such other 
or others as joint tenants by use of such words 
. as herein provided OR by conveying to another 
person or persons an interest in land in which an 
interest is retained by the grantor and by declar-
ing the creation of a joint tenancy by use of such 
words as herein provided. In all cases the interest 
of joint tenants n1ust be equal and undivided." 
( En1phasis added) 
ln any event, regardless of the mechanics adopted, 
a joint tenancy in real estate can be created only by a 
conrcya uce or a transfer. The letter of escrow instruc-
tions is not pr01nissory in character, nor do such instruc-
tions constitute an instrument norn1ally intended to he 
a grant of interest between co-vendors of the related con-
tract. The letter of escrow instruction does not satisf~· 
the definition of conveyance set forth in Section 57-1-1 
rcA 1953, nor does it satisfy the definition of "transfer." 
In the early case of Ober v. Schenck, 23 "Ctah 614, 65 P. 
101:~. the Court indicated that the term "transfer," when 
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used in its ordinary sense, is applicable to real property 
and is either synonymous with the word sale or imports 
something more than, or subsequent to, sale. As used in 
Section 57-1-5 [;TCA 19'53 the tel'ln "transfer" would seem 
to imply an unequivocal and unconditional grant to an-
other, which is not the case under the escrow instructions. 
Even if this Court should determine that the doctrine 
of equitable conversion should be invoked and that tlw 
interest of James and Isabella Allred becmne an interest 
in personalty, then, Appellant alternatively submits that 
the letter of escrow instructions by its nature was not 
adequate to create a joint tenancy, regardless of the lan-
guage appearing therein. Language alone is not the sole 
test of the creation of a joint tenancy. The instrument 
itself in which the language is contained is also 1naterial. 
Indeed, it is the accepted rule that a joint tenancy can 
arise only by a grant or a det:ise. 14 Am. Jur. ''Co-
tenancy" section 11 states : 
"A distinguishing characteristic of the estate 
in joint tenancy is the circumstance that it arises 
solely by way of grant or devise .... " 
Appellant submits that the letter of escrow instruction 
is not in the nature of either a grant or a devise, but is 
merely what it purports to be-a letter of instruction to 
the escrow agent. 
This Court, in Tangen 'C. Ingalls, 12 U. 2d 388, 367 
P.2d 179, in dealing with a question relating to a joint 
bank aecount, recognized that the nature of the instru-
Inent lwaring the language alleged to create a joint ten-
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mwy m personalty is 111aterial. At page 390 of that 
opinion this Court stated: 
··Another factor having an iinportant bearing 
on the rights of the parties inter-se is that the 
dt>posit card is basically an agreement with the 
bank. It is prepared by the bank, is signed by the 
parties at its request, and for the bank's protec-
tion. Therefore, its recitals need not necessarily 
he n~garded primarily as an agreement between 
the parties, nor reflect the true relationship be-
tween them." 
If the r<>citals of the bank deposit card are not an 
a~reement lwtwPPn the signers thereof, and not "reflec-
tin· of the true relationship between them," then it would 
seem a fortiori that the recitals of an escrow letter of 
instruction, intended as the fulfillment of a prior contract 
t'\lY<'nant, and usually conditional on the performance of 
i'Prtain conditions by the other party, must be an even 
le~~ reliable indication of the true relationship intended 
h~tween the parties. 
A close look at the nature of the letter of instruction 
n•veals that it is not appropriate for the creation of a 
joint tenancy because the property which is the subject 
of the escrow and the subject of the alleged joint tenancy 
may lw retaken in the event the purchasers fail to per-
form the conditions of the contract. In such a case, the 
subject Inatter of the intended joint tenancy is regained 
hy the co-vendors and the sale contract is voided. It would 
not ~t)Pm correct to allow the creation of a joint tenancy 
by a writing that was conditional in its operation and 
eonspquently lacking in the finality associated with an 
in:4rument ha\ing the effect of a grant. The language 
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relied on by the lower court see1ns to have been casually 
used as one step in the chain of buying or selling real 
estate. Furthernwre, because escrow instructions an· 
often executed by the parties as necessary acts in per-
fonnance of the earlier agreement to sell, there would 
seem to be little about the execution of such an instrument 
that would vouch for the intent of the parties to establish 
rights or interests by such instructions. In the case of the 
joint bank account, the depositor's concern relates to the 
fund which is the bank account. In the case of escrow 
instructions, the vendor signing such papers does not 
necessarily relate his acts to the fund or proceeds due 
under the contract from the purchaser, but could be 
expected to associate his acts with the completion of a 
transaction without special concern for the impact which 
language in the escrow instructions might have on the 
proceeds due him from the purchaser. 
The Court's attention is directed to the widespread 
use throughout this state of ecrow letters of instruction, 
in printed form, which 1nake use of the tenn •• or the sur-
vivor," and which have been executed by numerous par-
ties throughout the state whether or not they intend to 
create a joint tenancy. Appellant suggests that the reason 
for such language in the escrow instructions, in the case 
of 1nultiple party sellers or buyers, is to authorize the 
esrrow agent to deal with either such party without sus-
pending such transactions pending the appointment of an 
adn1inistrator in the event of the death of one of the 
sellers or buyers. 
To sustain the decision of the court below would, as 
111 this ease. have the effect of creating joint tenancies 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
umh·r circumstan<'l'S where there was no intention of 
,·n·ntin~ ~uch by the parties executing the escrow instruc-
tions . 
. \ppt>llant sub1nits that the instant case demon-
~tratP~ why tlw law does not favor joint tenancies. In 
thi~ ca~e, the court below found that the instructions cre-
ated a joint tenancy and that Mrs. Allred, upon the death 
of her husband, was entitled to waive payment for what 
had been substantially all of the property which had been 
his prior to the agreement and execution of the escrow 
instructions. The agreement of sale of May 27, executed 
only four days before, made no reference to the intent of 
Janws to create a joint tenancy between himself and his 
wife. Appellant asserts that the policy of the law which 
requires a clear expression of intent to create a joint 
tPnancy would be violated by a ruling that the letter of 
1'8e.row instructions was sufficient to create a joint ten-
aney. 
It is worth noting that the language of the letter of 
instructions, •'to us or the survivor of us" can be given a 
reasonable 1neaning other than the creation of a joint 
tenancy. ).[r. and :Jirs. Allred each owned certain tracts 
of land as their separate property and they owned other 
land in joint tenancy. Both the separate and jointly held 
land were included in the agreement of sale. Thus, the 
language ••to us or the survivor of us" may have been in-
tt·nded as an instruction to the escrow agent to deliver 
the particular deeds deposited when the vendee had Inade 
full payment to each vendor for the amount due for the 
tracts owned separately, i.e., "to us" and when full pay-
ment had also been 1nade for the jointly held property, 
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which, in the event of the death of either could be made 
to .the other, i.e., "or the survivor of us." Such a construc-
tion would seem justified in in this case, since the nature 
of the writing does not seem to satisfy the policy requir-
ing a high degree of certainty of intent. 
· The court below erred in concluding frmn the find-
ings that the letter of instruction created a joint tenancy 
because the four unities necessary for existence of a 
joint tenancy did not exist. 14 Am. Jur. "Cotenancy" 
Section 7 expresses the require1nent as follows: 
"In order to constitute a joint tenancy, four 
requisites must exist, namely: the tenants must 
have one and the same interest; the interests must 
accrue by one and the same conveyance; they 
must commence at one and the same time; and 
the property must be held by one and the same 
undivided possession. In other words, there must 
be four unities: (1) unity of interest, (2) unity 
of title, (3) unity of time, and ( 4) unity of pos-
session. If any one of these ele1nents is lacking, 
the estate will not be one in joint tenancy." 
The court below found that, as a result of the agree-
Inent of ~fay 27, 1958, and the application of the doctrine 
of equitable conversion, James and Isabell Allred held 
interests as tenants in common to the proceeds due under 
that contract. Assu1ning for the sake of the immediate 
argument, that the doctrine of equitable conversion is ap-
plicable, there is nothing in the operation and legal effect 
of the doctrine that would create a tenancy in common 
between James F. and Isabell Allred in the proceeds of 
the sales contract. Such doctrine would merely change 
the nature of the property interest of the grantors from 
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real estatP to personalty. X othing about the doctrine 
would create a tenancy in cmmnon. Grantors included 
both separately owned and jointly owned property in a 
single contract of sale, and did so without including a 
provision for distributing the portion of the total con-
tract price due for each tract of real estate. No language 
that would indicate an intention to create a tenancy in 
common was included in the agremnent of sale. 
The court below apparently used their failure to al-
locate the respective amounts due each as the basis for 
concluding that a tenancy in conunon was created. Appel-
lant sub1nits that this was error. In respect to the prop-
Prty held by James Allred and Isabell Allred separately, 
the only effect of equitable conversion would be to con-
vt'rt each particular tract of land into an interest in per-
sonalty. Their failure to apportion the proceeds does 
not create a tenancy in comnwn, since in that case it 
would have been necessary to decide that they both had 
a right to take possession of the whole contract price. 
~uch a unity of possession is essential to the existence 
of a tenancy in cmnrnon. 14 Arn. Jttr . .. Cotenancy" Sec-
tion 16 states : 
.. Unlike the joint tenancy, the tenancy in com-
Inon is characterized by a single essential unity-
that of possession, or of the right to possession, 
of the cmnmon property. If such unity exists, 
there is a tenancy in comn1on irrespective of any 
other unities; and if it does not exist the estate 
is not a tenancy in common." 
Since J a1nes and Isabell Allred have an imn1ediate 
right to a separate part of the purchase price, the unity 
of possession does not exist in this case. To hold that 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a tenancy in common was created by the failure to allo-
cate the purchase price would be to substitute the imme-
diate right of both James and Isabell to bring an action 
to ·establish their individual part of the contract price 
with the common law rule requiring the consent of the 
owners for a division or in the alternative, an action in 
equity to sever the interests. 
If the operation of the doctrine of equitable conYer-
sion could not have resulted in the creation of a tenancy 
in common between James and Isabell Allred, then a 
fortiori the letter of instructions to the escrow agent 
could not have created a joint tenancy. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE 
LETTER OF ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS CONSTITUTED AN 
ATTEMPTED TES'TAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF PROP-
ERTY AND WAS THEREFORE INVALID. 
· The following language appeared in the escro"T in-
structions : 
"2. In the event said Purchasers shall fail to pay 
any of the installments provided for in that 
certain Agreement bearing date the 27th day 
of May, A. D. 1958, promptly and when due, 
then upon our written demand, you shall re-
turn to us all of said papers and documents, 
whereupon your duties, responsibilities and 
liabilities of every kind and character, under 
the terms of this Escrow, shall cease and 
terminate." 
It appears from the transcript, though counsel for 
Isabell Allred did not include this n1atter in the amend-
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uwnt to tlw original findings as ht• was directed by the 
Court to do, that the Court below Blade a finding that 
therP was $1000.00 delinquent under the contract at the 
tinw JumP~ F. Allred died, that being the pay1nent due 
from Defendants approxilnately three Inonths prior to 
.lamPs Allred's death. Under the terms of the escrow 
dt•}wsit, after the paYJnent became delinquent James F. 
Alln·d had a right to demand that the escrow agent re-
turn the deeds. Thus, James Allred had, prior to and 
at the time of his death, the right after such default to 
recall the deeds deposited with the escrow agent. His 
power to control the disposition of the deeds until his 
death, rendered the deposit of the deeds with the escrow 
agent a conditional deposit. Based on the determination 
that the escrow deposit was conditional it would seem 
to follow that the delivery by the escrow agent, being 
subject to the direction of J runes Allred until his death, 
was not a delivery irrevocably effective prior to the death 
of J runes ~-\.llred. The conclusion would seem inevitable 
that the deed, which was eventually delivered to the 
defendants was in the nature of a testamentary deed and 
invalid as a testamentary disposition. 
The court in Dixon v. Dameron's Ad1ninistrator, 256 
Ky. 1:2:2, 77 ~.\Y. (2d) 6, defined a testamentary disposi-
tion as follows : 
"It n1ust be ambulatory in its nature and re-
vocable at the will of the maker." 
In the case of Juneau v. Dethgens, 200 VVis. 360, 228 
X.\r. 496, the court in considering a land contract which 
provided for payment in installments and contained a 
clause to the effect that on the death of the vendor the 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"'vhole of this contract is assigned without any further 
payments or consideration and the title thereof passed 
to the (purchaser) in fee simple," held that this provision 
was testamentary in character and that it could be re-
voked by a subsequent will n1ade by the vendor. 
By its own terms the escrow instructions, used by tht> 
court below to create a joint tenancy, was subject to 
termination in the event the grantees defaulted on their 
payments, which default was found to have occurred here. 
Since the power to control any interest arising under 
the instructions was retained by James Allred such right 
passed on to his estate or else created an interest in an-
other taking effect at his death. If the latter, it must fol-
low that the escrow instructions constituted a testament-
ary disposition and was therefore invalid for failure to 
comply with the statutory forn1alities for wills. (See Sec-
tion 74-1-5, UCA 1953) 
The letter of escrow instructions further contains the 
following: 
"3. In the event both of us shall depart this life 
during the term of this contract, then upon 
satisfactory proof being made to you that 
both of us are deceased, all payments there-
after due are to be abated and you are to 
make delivery, to the purchasers, all of said 
papers and instruments as though the pur-
chase price had been paid in full." 
Appellant submits that the above clause attempts to 
create a future estate in the grantees, subject to the 
interest of grantors during their lifetime. Without trying 
to label the future interest created by the escrow instruc-
tions, it see1ns clear that the grantees haye the possibility 
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of obtaiuing the legal title to the propP.rty by paying con-
:-;iderably less than the original contract price. It would 
seem that the contingent estate attempted to be created 
hy the escrow instructions is not related to any terms of 
the contract in which the defendants agreed to purchase 
the fee title. Such contingent estate is intended to take 
(\ffect after the death of James Allred, which is a neces-
sary condition precedent thereto, regardless of whether 
he is or is not survived by his wife. It is without consid-
eration and could also be terminated at the will of Mr. 
Allred, after any default occurred, at all time until his 
death. For this reason, the estate is created by the event 
of his death, and is therefore an interest in real prop-
torty created by a testamentary disposition, and invalid. 
Appellant conceeds that the contingent estate created 
h~· the escrow instructions would be valid if J atnes All-
rl'd had, by an intervivos transfer, irrevocably created 
the future interest in the defendant, even though making 
it subject to a life estate in the survivor. Likewise, it is 
conceded that such an interest could validly have been 
ereated by a will confor1ning to the statutory technicali-
tie~. Appellant subtnits, however, that atten1pted use 
of the escrow instructions to create a future interest, as 
herein atte1npted, is invalid, since no future interest is 
irrevocably created prior to J an1es Allred's death. 
'r e therefore submit that the letter of escrow in-
:-:tructions is an attempted testrunentary disposition be-
cause it has the effect (if the trial court's detennination 
i~ sustained) of creating a joint tenancy between J mnes 
.-\..llred and Isabell Allred to take effect upon death and 
because it attempts to create a future interest in the de-
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fendants. Appellant 1naintains that an escrow instruc-
tion should not be allowed to becon1e a device whereby a 
person can transfer, at death, property as a gift, by 
retaining the right to recall the escrow until death; al-
though by not doing so, the escrow instruction would be-
come a basis for a survivorship right in smneone elsr. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Appellant submits that the lower court 
erred in applying the doctrine of equitable conversion 
in this case with no findings of fact to support or justify 
the same and further in concluding from the Findings 
of Fact as made that a joint tenancy was created between 
James F. Allred and his wife Isabell by the letter of 
escrow instructions. The trial court should have deter-
mined that upon the death of James F. Allred his inter-
est in the property and the proceeds thereafter payable 
under the contract passed to his heirs, subject to pro-
hate, and that his Estate has the right to exercise any 
forfeiture provision contained in the contract for default 
on the part of the Defendants; that Plaintiff in Inter-
vention could not waive the provisions of the contract 
or the escrow instructions and therefore that the delivery 
of the instruments of conveyance should be rescinded and 
the Defendants directed to reconvey the property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN 
Price, Utah 
ARTHUR H. KIELSEN 
510 Newhouse Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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